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Abstract 
This article utilises the concept of policy framing to examine regulatory choices and the 
contestation of such choices in the context of hydraulic fracturing in the UK. The article makes 
no argument about the merits of fracking in the UK context, but rather explores how the 
institutional choices and design serve to shape the legal reasoning, thereby defining the ability 
of actors outside the London government to engage with its efforts to govern. Through the lens 
of recent judicial decisions in which claimants have sought to challenge privileged policy 
frames supportive of hydraulic fracturing, the article finds that the deferential approach taken 
by the courts serves to reinforce privileged frames, resulting in there being little scope to 
challenge such frames.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The United Kingdom finds itself at the frontier in Europe for the extraction of shale gas reserves 
through the process of hydraulic fracturing, better known as ‘fracking’.1 While the rest of the 
European Union (EU) has moved away from a focus on fracking due to political choice or the 
absence of viable shale reserves,2 the UK government has gone ahead with a position 
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supporting the exploration of shale production with the aim of tapping this energy system.3  In 
the context of the economic impact of the post 2007 global recession as well as the political 
and economic uncertainties of the UK relationship to the EU, the Cameron and May 
governments have promoted a national strategy to stimulate this industry in the face of 
considerable opposition from both the general public4 and devolved governments and local 
authority governments.5 Nevertheless, the nature of the national unitary institutional and 
electoral systems has enabled the government to push through this opposition and reinforce 
fracking efforts in England.6 
 The lack of a national consensus means that there is an important story to tell about 
how the battle will be continue between the government position and the range of opposing 
groups. The purpose of this article is to explain the role of the UK courts in determining whether 
the government’s definition of the fracking issue and its strategic plan can overcome attempts 
to oppose the government stance and preferences.  In the efforts to decide fracking cases, the 
UK courts are not merely ruling on administrative procedures but rather deciding what scope 
critics of the government policy have to challenge fracking decision-making, ultimately 
legitimising the policy preferences contained in the UK regulatory approach to fracking. 
Consequently judicial decisions have the ability to shape the future policy debate over fracking 
within the UK as well as the degree of societal engagement with the decision-making process. 
The article’s structure proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the insights that 
the concept of policy framing provides for legal analysis.  In particular the policy framing 
approach stresses the importance in how all legal and policy actors define the issue and the 
solutions that flow from that definition. While there is always a possibility for rational 
consensus-building, the likelihood of an issue involving high visibility and strongly contrasting 
policy views is one that will see conflict.  The core analytical insight of this piece is to stress 
how policy framing can be used to limit policy debate and the contestation about administrative 
decisions.  The recent court cases examined in this article suggest that the courts will play a 
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limited role in broadening the scope of conflict and opposition to the UK’s administrative 
approach to hydraulic fracturing, as well as the possibilities for societal actors to counter this 
approach. In a sense, the finding that the courts play a limited role in supervising administrative 
decision-making is neither revolutionary nor new. In supervising policy choices and 
administrative decisions giving force to such choices, the courts have traditionally maintained 
a principled focus on matters of legality. The point brought home in this article is that this focus 
severely restricts the scope afforded to those seeking to challenge fracking decisions. 
The third section provides an overview of the aspects of the UK regulatory regime that 
are most critical to understanding how the UK administration has framed the UK approach to 
fracking.  Particular attention is paid to the institutional choices that define the participation in 
governing this policy area and how that definition may restrain the voice of those actors holding 
different frames. 
The fourth section reviews two recent cases in the UK legal context.7 The two cases 
have been selected because they engage with particular framings of hydraulic fracturing and 
its regulation; these framings define the decisional outcome and the societal scope to object to 
the regulatory decision. This article makes no argument about the merits of fracking in the UK 
context, but rather explores how the institutional choices and design serve to shape the legal 
reasoning, thereby defining the ability of actors outside the London government to engage with 
its efforts to govern. 
 
FRAMING CONTESTATION: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Public policy and some legal scholars use the concept of policy framing to understand how 
different social/political actors manage to grasp and act upon complex situations.8  The policy 
framing process involves our protagonists (a) confronting a situation where the knowledge is 
uncertain and potentially contested; (b) building an understanding or narrative that enables 
these actors to assess the situation, and (c) then taking action and potentially persuading others 
to do likewise.9 Inherent in the framing approach is the reality that different individuals and 
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Matthew Cotton, Imogen Rattle and James Van Alstine, ‘Shale Gas Policy in the United Kingdom: An 
Argumentative Discourse Analysis’ (2014) 73 Energy Policy 427-438, approaching fracking debates from the 
perspective of discourse theory,  
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groups can view the same social and natural phenomena and produce different conclusions and 
reasoning. Integral in the framing of any policy or legal problem is an assessment of the 
potential roles of other involved parties; consequently framing will define the degree to which 
other potential actors are included and benefit from the policy/legal process and decisions.  This 
sets up a potential contestation as the resulting marginalized groups may contest the framing 
and perhaps even offer their alternative (‘counter’) frame. The argument of this section is that 
how framing occurs will shape the legal and political opportunities and the scope for 
contestation by different actors involved in the fracking issue. 
Schön and Rein focus their discussion of policy framing on the reality that conflicting 
policy frames will exist in most modern policy areas.10  These frames involve stories or 
structures of understanding that human belief and perception have created. When confronted 
by a contested and/or uncertain policy problem, diverse elements of society focus upon 
different elements and linkages between these elements to build substantially dissimilar 
perceptions of reality. Often these frames are tacit in nature, which partially explains the 
difficulty of reconciling different frames as the competing frame proponents lack the ability to 
actively scrutinise and judge the contrasting frames.  In order to gather support, these frames 
must have resonance with a wider group of actors in order to attract resources and build 
coalitions of actors with like-minded interests and approaches.11 
Tacit or not, these frames are critical in defining what is the interest of the different 
actors in the policy sector.  The linkage between frames and interests is what galvanises action 
and support on behalf of the frames, and it reinforces the potential for contestation.  For Schön 
and Rein, such differences will manifest themselves in a contested dialogue that will involve 
two forms of discourse.12  The first discourse involves the different actors seeking to prevail 
with their policy stories in a particular policy domain, using persuasion, evidence and other 
rhetorical means.13  The second discourse involves contestation over the policy practice that 
should follow –i.e. actors develop the policy stories that influence the creation of procedures, 
specific policy tools et cetera that will deliver the policy.  This is an important distinction as 
the British policy discussion involves not simply a definition of the issue of fracking but a 
                                                          
10 Donald Schön, and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies 
(Basic Books 1994). 
11 William A Mirola, 'Asking for Bread, Receiving a Stone: The Rise and Fall of Religious Ideologies in Chicago's 
Eight-hour Movement’ (2003) 50(2) Social Problems 273-293. 
12 Schön and Rein above n 10, 28-32. 
13 E.g. Ole W Pedersen, ‘The Rhetoric of Environmental Reasoning and Responses as Applied to Fracking’ (2015) 
27 JEL 325-334. 
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consideration of what are the correct procedures, policy instruments and who is involved in 
these procedures and instruments. 
Schön and Rein theorise that a process of reflection about the frames, where actors learn 
more about their actions and the consequences of their actions may lead to a process of learning 
and ‘reframing’, in which actors use reflection and discourse in a way that leads to a rational, 
consensual resolution of the policy dispute.14  Nevertheless, they accept that this is only one 
possibility for dealing with contention. Actors may opt for an escalation of the struggle, by 
seeking to re-package the object of their frame to accommodate and make alliances with the 
like-minded interests of other actors operating in the policy sector, or by working out some 
political compromise, emphasising give and take, which can satisfy the opposing parties.15   
While all of these possibilities are true, the fracking policy problem in the UK context 
has a number of elements that make the more rational compromises less tractable.16  One 
dimension is the continuing policy uncertainty considering the implications of the fracking 
operations for UK communities and the environment more generally. As indicated before, this 
allows the possibility of multiple frames and enhances the difficulty in reconciling these 
frames.  Second, the competing groups have frames with some fundamental differences in their 
‘meta-narratives’ (the overarching values and perspectives on how the world works and should 
work), for instance whether the best response to the ongoing problem of climate change is the 
speediest possible abandonment of fossil fuel extraction.  Finally, the impact and costs of 
hydraulic fracturing extraction and shipment operations generate a relatively high cost-benefit 
dynamic for particular groups of societal actors, unlike the more diffuse policy problems such 
as climate change.17 The high visibility of such activities as well as the other characteristics 
challenge the possibilities of resolution through rational, technocratic discussions. The likely 
outcome is a contestation between coalitions wielding different frames. 
Elmer Schattschneider captures this dynamic in arguing that all political contestation 
involves the question of the ‘scope of conflict’, which reflects the number of actors involved 
in a policy debate.18 When there are a relatively limited number of players in a policy solution, 
it is much more likely that those actors with an advantage in resources, whether administrative 
authority, knowledge, finance and so forth, will overcome the other parties in the debate. 
                                                          
14 Schön and Rein above n 10, 170-172, 186-187. 
15 Ibid., 170-171. 
16 Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Technocracy in the European Union’ (Addison Wesley Longman 1999). 
17 Fedor A Dokshin, ‘Whose Backyard and What’s at Issue? Spatial and Ideological Dynamics of Local 
Opposition to Fracking in New York State, 2010 to 2013’ (2016) 81(5) American Sociological Review 921-948. 
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Things become much less certain when a greater range of actors join into the situation; here 
the actors in the dominant position may lose control of the situation and the policy debate. Thus 
the political game becomes one where actors seek to control the scope of conflict.  Those who 
favour the status quo on a given policy question will have a considerable interest in limiting 
the scope of conflict and the number of participants.19  Those actors who are engaged in the 
debate but feel they are losing the issue or those excluded from this debate have a considerable 
incentive to widen the participation in the debate. 
Framing of the policy problem and solution becomes a core element of this contestation 
over the scope of conflict. Thus, any given policy sector will see coalitions of actors seeking 
to make their particular frame the dominant one in addressing the policy problem, while 
keeping opposing frames, or counter-framing, in a highly marginalised position. The origins of 
the framing concept in the study of social movements have tended to give less attention to elite 
framing with the assumption that these are rather fixed and static arenas that social movements 
seek to penetrate.  However, there is an ongoing and evolving engagement between the state 
and society that needs further elaboration.  Noakes argues for the importance of understanding 
the role ‘official frames’ can have in both mobilising elements of society to support positions 
and to counter alternative voices.20 Noakes suggests that state actors will draw on an established 
repertoire of frames but may also seek to adapt new framings in order to maintain legitimacy 
and preserve authority over society.21 These framings, together with the ability to deploy 
legal/administrative authority as well as allocative resources can lead to the official frame being 
dominant to the exclusion or varying degree of marginalisation of other potential counter-
framings. 
In light of recent judicial decisions on fracking, this article examines the extent to which 
existing UK regulatory frames impact on the ability of critics to challenge these existing 
frames. That is, what avenues are available to critics in the attempt to challenge existing 
regulatory frames? Further, to the extent critics are able to promote counter-frames, how are 
these engaged with by the courts? Before examining the relevant cases in detail, the section 
below sets out an overview of the regulatory regime and institutional choices relating to 
fracking. 
 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 4-5. 
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FRACKING REGULATION IN THE UK 
 
The regulatory system in place for fracking in the UK is a complex and multi-layered 
arrangement, engaging several separate regimes and regulatory authorities. At the heart of the 
regulatory approach stands the decision by the government to engage in regulation of 
environmental risks arising from fracking activities primarily through the use of existing 
regulatory structures (notwithstanding calls for the need for explicit and tailored regimes) 
alongside a strong political support for fracking.22 Together this support and emphasis on 
existing regulatory regimes give rise to a regulatory system with the ultimate aim to advance 
the extraction of oil and gas through fracking.23 That is, the institutional and regulatory choices 
which are manifested in the regulatory regime for fracking ultimately serve to give force to this 
underlying policy assumption in favour of fracking. The core narrative of the frame involves 
the objective of boosting fracking extraction. The definition of the policy challenge contained 
in this narrative is balancing the desire to enhance the UK’s position in terms of economic 
prosperity, energy resource capacity and technological advancement against the risks involved 
in the extraction and production processes.24 The government frame views these risks as being 
containable in the current regulatory and planning processes (solution discourse).   This official 
frame sharply contrasts with a key counter-frame often advanced by opponents of fracking, 
who argue that fracking activities ought to be limited in order to minimise climate change 
impacts.25 
Two main features stand out in this regard. First, though some decision-making powers 
are conferred on local planning authorities, the main regulatory authorities charged with 
overseeing fracking activities are central or national agencies. These include, at the time of 
writing, the Oil and Gas Authority (issuing petroleum licenses under the Petroleum Act 1998) 
and the Environment Agency (overseeing the permits required prior to commencing fracking 
activities under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (England and Wales) 2016) as well 
as the Health and Safety Executive (charged with overseeing the safety of a well site).  Prior to 
engaging in fracking operations (be it exploratory or substantial drilling), an operator will thus 
                                                          
22 E.g. Joanne Hawkins, ‘Fracking: Minding the Gaps’ (2015) 17 ELR 8-21. 
23 See Elen Stokes, ‘Regulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the UK Governance of Fracking’ 
(2016) 79(6) MLR 961-986, for an analysis of the governance means deployed by the government to achieve this 
end.  
24 Daniel Nyberg, Christopher Wright and Jaqueline Kirk, ‘Fracking the Future: Temporality, Framing and the 
Politics of Unconventional Fossil Fuels’ (2017) 1 Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings and 
Cotton et al above n 8. 
25 E.g. by Friends of the Earth: https://friendsoftheearth.uk/climate-change/fracking (accessed 16 March 2018). 
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have to apply for environmental permits from the Environment Agency (in England) for a 
series of activities related to fracking, including for activities relating to mining waste activities, 
radioactive substance activities, water discharge activities, groundwater activities, flood risk 
activities, and for activities relating to the facility itself (e.g. flaring of excess gas and storage 
of fracking substances on site etc.).26  
Second, to the extent decision-making takes place outside these centralised agencies, it 
is significantly constrained in practice by explicit executive decree. Thus, though an operator 
will have to apply for planning consent from local planning authorities prior to the 
commencement of drilling under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the Government 
has indicated that it will consider ‘actively’ calling in planning applications for fracking 
activities while also promising to identify ‘underperforming local planning authorities that 
repeatedly fail to determine [..] applications within statutory timeframes’.27 The strong 
direction, or ‘steer’, from the government on local decision-making suggests not only that the 
onus is on local planning authorities to justify any diversion from the government’s stated 
preference for shale gas exploration, but it is also suggestive of the way in which force is lent 
to the Government’s preferences and favoured official frame (i.e. promoting fracking and 
seeking to regulated using extant policy tools) by way of regulatory design. One example of 
this is the emphasis in the planning system on centrally promulgated planning guidance 
documents. Not surprisingly this policy guidance serves in part to give force to government 
preferences towards fracking.28 Consequently, the Government’s preferences are considerably 
and explicitly strengthened through the institutional choices and regulatory designs through 
which fracking is regulated. 
This strong centralisation has significant potential to impact on the extent to which 
actors are included in the decision-making process as well as on the likelihood of success of 
subsequent challenges to administrative fracking decisions. In a different policy context, Lee 
et al thus demonstrate that, for planning decisions which benefit from strategic government 
support, there is often limited scope for the public to substantively influence decisions through 
processes of public participation.29 In addition to this, Hilson has demonstrated, specifically in 
the context of fracking, how existing regulatory systems (as well as frames) serve to privilege 
                                                          
26 Environmental Permitting Regulations (England and Wales) 2016 SI 2016 no 1154. 
27 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shale-gas-and-oil-policy-statement-by-decc-and-dclg/shale-gas-
and-oil-policy-statement-by-decc-and-dclg (accessed March 16 2018). 
28 E.g. Planning Practice Guidance: Minerals available on https://www.gov.uk/guidance/minerals (accessed 
March 16 2018). 
29 Maria Lee et al ‘Public participation and Climate Change Infrastructure’ (2012) 25(1) JEL 33–62. 
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certain policy-arguments over others (notably in the context of climate change impacts arising 
from fracking activities).30 In light of this, it is relevant to consider the ability of critics to 
challenge, i.e. dispute, decisions arising from the existing use of frames and decisions. This is 
done specifically in the context of two recent decisions delivered by the Planning Court of the 
Queen’s Bench Division and the Court of Appeal, engaging with specific environmental 
impacts arising out of fracking activities.  
Before examining the decisions in detail, a few preliminary points must be made. First, 
the institutional choices and thereby the mechanisms through which critics can challenge 
administrative decisions relating to fracking are, as a matter of course, likely to have a 
significant impact on not only the chance of ‘success’ but also on what arguments claimants 
will be able to advance as a matter of law. As will be discussed in more detail below, where 
opponents of fracking have been unsuccessful in shaping government policy-making and local 
administrative fracking decisions in the planning system, the main outlet for challenging 
fracking decisions is the courts. Once the contestation of policy choices moves from the 
‘political’ to the ‘legal’, limits on what constitutes valid and relevant grounds for a challenge 
take a different shape insofar as claimants will have to give careful thought to how best to 
phrase (and frame) their arguments in legal vocabularies.31 Obvious as this may be, it must be 
borne in mind that the ‘distinctively legal’ focus of the courts necessarily restrains the typology 
of grounds of challenge (e.g. illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety) and ultimately 
the type of arguments available to the claimants.32     
Concretely, the primary regulatory background through which challenges are likely to 
be mounted is the planning regime. Ultimately, however, this often means judicial review, 
given that the planning system does not provide statutory appeal rights to third-parties (the 
same goes for the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016) or on a 
rare occasion statutory appeals under s. 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.33 
This is significant in itself as those seeking to challenge administrative fracking decisions will 
have to ‘fit’ any counter-fracking arguments within the parameters of the review and appeal 
regimes in the form of, first, claims/heads of review and, second, scope of review. In the context 
                                                          
30 Hilson above n 8. 
31 See Ole W Pedersen, ‘A Study of Administrative Environmental Decision-Making before the Courts’ JEL 
forthcoming, highlighting the dichotomy between the often politicised nature of environmental law and policy 
debates and the exclusively legal nature of judicial hearings.  
32 Peter Cane, Controlling Administrative Power (CUP 2016) 230. See also E Fisher, B Lange and E Scotford, 
Environmental Law Text and Materials (OUP 2013), 285-288. 
33 It is widely accepted today that the substantive differences between e.g. a statutory appeal under s. 288 of the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and judicial review are rather minor. E.g. E v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49 per Carnwath LJ [42]. 
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of the former, it may well be that a challenge to an administrative decision taken in pursuance 
of the planning regime, because of the discretionary and flexible nature of the regime, lends 
itself better to a claim based on unreasonableness (as opposed to illegality). One problem 
associated with this particular choice of grounds is that a claim in irrationality is all the more 
challenging to pull off.34 In respect to the scope of review, as is discussed below, the limited 
scope of review poses acute challenges for those seeking to call into question the government’s 
fracking policy. In these types of challenges, it is evident that the courts engage in a restrained 
review of planning decisions, striking a tone of deference towards planning authorities.35  
 
RECENT JUDICIAL FRACKING DECISIONS 
This section identifies two recent cases in which the a priori supportive framing of fracking, 
manifesting itself in institutional and regulatory choice and policy design, has served to shape 
the subsequent judicial outcome. The first decision was delivered by Lang J in R (Friends of 
the Earth) Anor v North Yorkshire County Council in which the claimants challenged the grant 
of planning permission to Third Energy for the exploration and production of gas by way of 
hydraulic fracturing.36 The main argument in the claimants’ challenge was that the Council had 
unlawfully failed to take into account the climate change impacts likely to arise from the 
exploration and burning of gas at a nearby gas-fired electricity generating power station.37 
Though Lang J seemingly accepted that environmental impacts arising from the subsequent 
and cumulative burning of gas were capable of having ‘significant adverse effects’ for the 
purpose of the EIA Directive,38 she ultimately found that it was up to the local planning 
committee to judge the weight to be afforded to these impacts against all other material 
considerations.39 Though this conclusion is entirely in line with established judicial practice 
when it comes to supervising the exercise of planning judgement and the weighing of material 
considerations against one another,40 Lang J relied on two lines of reasoning to substantiate her 
                                                          
34 Outside the context of planning see e.g. R v Lord Chancellor Ex p. Maxwell [1997] 1 W.L.R. 104 per Henry LJ 
[109]. 
35 E.g. R (Newsmith) v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport & the Regions [2001] EWHC 74 (Admin) 
per Sullivan J (as he then was).  
36 R (Friends of the Earth Anor) v North Yorkshire County Council [2016] EWHC 3303 (Amin). The planning 
permission was thus awarded for full exploration (‘stimulation’) as opposed to merely explorative drilling.  
37 An additional point of contention was whether the Council had misdirected itself in law by not requiring that 
the Third Energy provide a financial bond as cover for long-term environmental impacts.  
38 [21]. 
39 [57].  
40 E.g. R (Zurich Assurance Ltd as Threadneedle Property Investments) v North Lincolnshire Council [2012] 
EWHC 3708 (Admin) per Hickinbottom J [16] and St Modwen Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ 1643 per Lindblom LJ [6]. 
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findings, highlighting the ultimately limited extent to which critics are able to challenge 
decisions made within existing regulatory frames and structures. 
The first line of reasoning follows necessarily from the focus in the EIA Directive on 
‘projects’41 and the emphasis in the planning system on ‘development’.42 The planning 
application granted for the well and thereby the development/project that the claimant sought 
to challenge necessarily stood apart from the existing gas-fired power station to which the gas 
was to be piped. As a matter of statutory construction (not to say physical construction), the 
former was a ‘development’ whereas the latter was not: ‘no development was taking place at 
[the gas-fired power station]43 and the present application sought no increase in the capacity at 
the power station.’44 The result of this was that the only extent to which environmental impacts 
from greenhouse gas emissions were considered was in the context of fugitive emissions from 
the well itself (which the operator identified as negligible) and any potential minimal impacts 
from the construction of the well itself – not from the potential and cumulative impact from the 
generating of electricity.45  
 Second, Lang J, stressed that, where the local planning committee had been made 
aware of the potential for an increase in greenhouse gas emissions as a result of planning 
permission being granted to fracking activities, it was up to the committee, as a matter of 
planning judgement, considering all material considerations, and in light of government policy 
on shale gas, to decide what weight to afford to such considerations. In other words, the 
potential impacts were readily identified as potential material considerations with the 
implication that the actual weight to be afforded to them being a matter of planning judgement 
for the planning authority. In making this decision, rehearsing a long line of precedent, Lang J 
cautioned against judicial interference in matters of planning judgements.46  
This gives rise to a situation where, as argued by the claimant, cumulative climate 
change impacts from greenhouse gasses are likely only to be given decisive emphasis by 
planning authorities in a limited number of circumstances. The circumstances in which the 
climate change counter frame will receive attention are, first, the unlikely scenario where the 
gas extracted from a well will be burnt for electricity generation as part of the development 
itself on site (as opposed to being piped to an existing site), thereby forming part a development 
                                                          
41 Directive 2011/92/EU (consolidated version 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/EIA_Directive_informal.pdf ) Art. 2 (accessed March 16 2018).   
42 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 Part III.  
43 Preston New Road Action Group v Secretary of State for Communities & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 9 [49]. 
44 Ibid [39]. 
45 Ibid [27], [33]-35]. 
46 N. 40 above. 
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(and EIA projects) for the purposes of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the EIA 
Directive. The second way in which the cumulative impacts of greenhouse gas emission from 
shale gas exploration may be taken into account by the local planning authority is, put simply, 
where the planning committee decides that such secondary impacts are a material consideration 
(which Lang J suggests that they might well be) and afford decisive weight to this factor. From 
Lang J’s decision, it seems that North Yorkshire County Council, as a matter of exercising its 
planning judgement, would have been entitled to find that cumulative climate change impacts 
ought to have been afforded greater weight, though it ultimately did not. The upshot of this is 
that the key counter frame (challenging the government’s reliance on fracking as a ‘bridge-
fuel’) with its emphasis on the long-term environmental impacts arising from the burning of 
fossil fuels and objective of keeping the natural gas in the ground is given a limited space in 
which to be aired. 
The second of the two recent decisions on which this article focuses is the statutory 
challenge in Preston New Road Action Group v Secretary of State for Communities & Anor to 
the grant of planning permission by the Secretary of State to hydraulic exploratory drilling of 
wells at Little Plumpton, Lancashire.47 A central focus of the claimants’ argument centred on 
the landscape impacts of the well site, thereby relying a ‘local environmental destruction’ 
frame.48 This ‘local environmental destruction’ frame contested the claim that landscape 
impacts were only temporary (as the drilling was exploratory), arguing instead that serious 
landscape harm may well arise out of drilling activities however short-lived they are.  A second 
line of argument was that the grant of planning permission was unlawful on the grounds that 
the environmental statement, forming part of the application, did not include potential 
cumulative climate change impacts from greenhouse gas emissions from subsequent phases of 
production should the exploration prove to be viable. As with the decision taken by the North 
Yorkshire County Council, no assessment was made of the likely environmental impacts from 
greenhouse gas emissions beyond the ones directly associated with the drilling itself (in this 
case primarily from flaring). In reaching a decision similar to Friends of the Earth, Lindblom 
LJ who delivered the Court’s opinion, endorsed the analogy drawn in the first instance by Dove 
J to Lang J’s judgment in Friends of the Earth to furnish the argument of the Court.  
The application was for a single project aimed exclusively at exploratory drilling and 
not for any subsequent commercial production of gas.49 Only where the exploratory drilling 
                                                          
47 [2018] EWCA Civ 9.  
48 E.g. Nyberg, above n 24.  
49 Ibid [63].  
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proved to be viable was commercial production to commence. Importantly, to Lindblom LJ, 
were commercial production to materialise, it would be a subsequent and separate project 
subject to a separate approval process, which would have to be assessed on its own planning 
merits. In this light, the claimant’s argument that potential future greenhouse gas emissions 
ought to be assessed had to fail as any environmental impacts arising from this were not 
‘indirect, secondary or cumulative’ but ‘a matter of conjecture’ and impossible to assess.50 In 
support of this conclusion, Lindblom LJ drew on planning policy guidance specifically stating 
that applications for exploratory drilling ought to be assessed on their own merit without taking 
into account prospective emissions from future ‘hypothetical future activities for which consent 
has not yet been sought, since the further appraisal and production phases will be the subject 
of separate planning applications and assessments.’51 
Notwithstanding that the two decisions appear similar at first sight, Lindblom LJ’s 
implicit reliance on the Friends of the Earth decision seemingly ignores the very premise on 
which that decision was reached. As exemplified in Friends of the Earth, the fact that a new 
planning application and environmental statement are proffered as a result of the drilling 
moving from the exploratory phase to the production phase does not in and of itself result in 
the cumulative climate change impacts being singled out for consideration. As noted above, 
this depends on other subsequent considerations, including whether or not the electricity-
generating facility receiving the shale gas is an existing stand-alone facility or whether it forms 
part of the development for which an application is submitted (which is unlikely). 
Consequently, there is no guarantee, as seemingly suggested by Lindblom LJ, that secondary 
and cumulative environmental impacts from greenhouse gasses are expressly taken into 
account. Moreover, the assumption that production-stage gas from shale repositories is not 
‘additional’ but likely to simply replace existing gas sources is, while intuitively attractive, 
perhaps overly simplistic if the purpose is to assess environmental impacts of a given activity. 
If the so-called shale gas revolution in the USA has proven anything, it is that attempts to 
predict energy market behaviour are notoriously difficult and fraught with challenges. Consider 
for example that the US shale gas boom has resulted in a short to medium-term increase in US 
coal exports to e.g. Europe.52 Furthermore, consider the pernicious rebound effect, according 
                                                          
50 Ibid [63]-[64]. 
51 Ibid [66] and Planning Practice Guidance: Minerals published by the Government in March 2014 available on 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/minerals (accessed March 14 2018). See also Dove J’s decision in the first instance: 
[2017] EWHC 808 (admin) [129]. 
52 An added consideration is the extent to which cheap natural gas extracted through fracking might replace not 
just use of coal as an energy source but also renewable sources such as wind power. See e.g. Daniel Raimi, The 
Fracking Debate (Columbia University Press, 2017) 110. 
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to which any efficiency gains (in this case in greenhouse gas emissions) are off-set by increases 
in consumption.  
Alternatively, consider the fact that the actual climate forcing of shale gas (and thereby 
potential environmental impacts) are hotly contested.53 Central to this uncertainty is the fact 
that the real climate change impact of fracking activities are likely to arise not necessarily from 
additional CO2 emissions but from the associated and unintended leakage of methane gasses, 
a much more potent greenhouse gas.54 This point is significant considering the relatively scant 
attention the issue of methane leakage received in the two cases. In Friends of the Earth as well 
as in Preston New Road Action Group the environmental impacts arising from leakage of 
methane gasses were not probed beyond what the operators had included in their respective 
environmental statements.55 In Preston New Road Action Group, Cuadrilla’s environmental 
statement suggested that leakage of methane gasses was likely to be minimal and that fugitive 
emissions would be greatly reduced. One problem associated with this argument, however, is 
that the rate at which methane leaks from energy production and storage is highly contested; 
this means that the environmental impacts arising from fugitive greenhouse gasses are not 
necessarily as straightforward as the environmental statements and ultimately the two 
judgments suggest.56 Consequently, even where shale gas ends up substituting existing gas in 
the downstream supply chain, the environmental impacts are likely to vary significantly. This 
point was not considered in detail by either of the two courts. 
Taken together, these two decisions illustrate how challenges to the dominant frames, 
pursued through government policies and institutional choices, are unlikely to succeed before 
the courts. By insisting that environmental impacts arising from greenhouse gas emissions will 
be assessed at a later stage, the courts implicitly endorse, the dominant government frame 
which favours hydraulic fracking at the expense of ‘challenger’ frames which frame hydraulic 
fracking by reference to the local environmental impacts and/or climate change impacts.57 This 
is not surprising. In supervising planning decisions the courts have always refrained from 
                                                          
53 Haewon McJeon et al, ‘Limited Impact on Decadal-Scale Climate Change from Increased used of Natural Gas’  
(2014) 514 Nature 482-485.   
54 Raimi above ch. 7. 
55 [2016] EWHC 3303 (Amin) [33]-[36] and [2018] EWCA Civ. [70]-[72]. 
56 Compare e.g. Anna Karion et al, ‘Methane Emissions Estimate From Airborne Measurements over a Western 
United States Natural Gas Field (2013) 40 (16) Geophysical Research Letters 4393-4397 to Jeff Peischl et al, 
‘Quantifying atmospheric methane emissions from oil and natural gas production in the Bakken shale region of 
North Dakota’ (2016)  121(10) Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmosphere 6101-6111 as well as Daniel 
Zavala-Araiza et al, ‘Reconciling divergent estimates of oil and gas methane emissions’ (2015) 112 (51) 
Proceedings of the National Academic of Sciences 15597-1560. 
57 Nyberg et al above n 24. 
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scrutinising planning judgement, weighing different material considerations against one 
another intensely.58  Similarly, the finding is not to be taken to suggest that the approach taken 
by the Planning Court and the Court of Appeal is wrong in law. On the contrary, planning 
policy and well established judicial precedent confirm that a planning authority ought to focus 
on whether the development for which a permission is sought is an acceptable use of land 
within the confines of the development plan and other material considerations. Moreover, it is 
well established that, in making this decision, planning authorities are entitled to assume that 
other environmental impacts (though relevant) will be dealt with by the relevant statutory 
regimes set up to do so.59 Similarly, there is ample authority endorsing judicial restraint in 
overruling decisions in which planning authorities have exercised planning judgement in 
striking a balance between competing interests.60 The point made here is merely that this 
deferential approach serves to reinforce existing frames, constraining the ability of critics to 
dispute the underlying policy assumptions and therefore also specific fracking decisions. In 
other words, existing frames, given force through institutional and regulatory design, serve to 
privilege certain lines of authority, restricting the scope for subsequent conflict resolution (at 
least insofar as this is taken to mean judicial resolution). Those seeking to challenge privileged 
frames are as a consequence unlikely to find recourse to doing so in the courts.61 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Scrutiny of recent judicial decisions engaging with fracking suggests that to the extent critics 
hope to challenge priorities afforded to fracking within existing policy frames, the courts are 
unlikely to provide a fruitful ‘space’ for counter-frames to be validated and for groups outside 
the governing process to expand the scope of conflict. Though the scale of fracking in the UK 
is still relatively small and the number of judicial challenges emerging is still low, the analysis 
put forward here suggests that, where existing frames are afforded priority (e.g. a pro-fracking 
frame set against an anti-fracking frame emphasising climate change impacts) as a matter of 
political expediency, these frames are likely to restrain the scope for critics to challenge these 
before independent arbiters like the courts. This is all the more the case when, as is the situation 
when it comes to decision-making for fracking in the UK, the relevant regulatory systems 
                                                          
58 N. 40 above. 
59 Gateshead MBC v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] Env LR 37. 
60 E.g. Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759.  
61 E.g. Gerald N Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 2nd ed. (University of 
Chicago Pres 2008).  
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afford a major role to the planning system – a system within which the courts have traditionally 
afforded decision-makers discretionary latitude. Moreover, the analysis suggests that the 
institutional choices which ultimately lay behind the decision to rely on existing regulatory 
systems (as opposed to designing an explicit and tailor-made one as many critics favour in the 
context of fracking) have important impacts on the way in which conflicts are ultimately 
resolved.62 
                                                          
62 Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (University 
of Chicago Press 1994).  
